


**OREGON SHIPS EXERCISE**  
(Strategic Homeland Initiatives Program Support)  
**MAY 19<sup>th</sup> & 20<sup>th</sup>, 2003**  
**COOS COUNTY, OREGON**



**A Full-Scale WMD/Bioterrorism Drill  
After Action Report**

**OREGON SHIPS  
COOS COUNTY, OREGON  
WMD – BIOTERRORISM EXERCISE**

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## **SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION**

### **1.0 PARTICIPANTS**

Approximately 74 persons participated in the exercise including representatives from the following agencies and/or organizations: Coos County Emergency Management; Coos County Public Health; Bay Area Hospital; Coos County Public Information Officers; City of Coquille; International Port of Coos Bay; City of Coos Bay Fire Department; City of Coos Bay Police Department; Bay Cities Ambulance; Red Cross; ORCA Communications (A subsidiary of the Coquille Indian Tribe); ARES/RACES HAM Radio Operators; Coquille Valley Hospital; Southern Coos Hospital; Oregon Emergency Management; Oregon Security Institute; MITRE Corporation; Diversified Safety Management; Goldstar/Mobile Satellite Systems/Motosat; MyStateUSA.Com; Radio Systems Marketing; Swan Island Networks/Oregon RAINS; Edge Wireless; Coquille School District #8; Southwestern Oregon Community College, Sause Bros., Inc., The World Newspaper; KCBY-TV; The Lighthouse Radio Group; Curry County Emergency Management; Coos County 911.

### **2.0 BACKGROUND & GOALS**

#### **2.1 Background**

Coos County is located on the Southwestern Coast of Oregon approximately 120 miles north of the California border. Its demographics encompass Oregon's largest coastal estuary and deep channel, international shipping port, surrounding coastal range forestland, tributary streams and rivers, which bring sport and commercial fishing, to the area. Logging and wood by-products remain the main industry of the small communities of this area. Highway 101 is the main motor corridor with State Highway 42 connecting inland valley communities to the area.

#### **2.2 Goals – Using WMD Scenario**

- Exercise Coos County Emergency Operations Plan.
- Exercise Coos County Health Department Emergency Operations Plan using WMD scenario.
- Exercise Bay Area Hospital – Community wide, multi agency exercise requirement.
- Test Communications infrastructure and systems.
- Test media relations and establish County PIO protocols.
- Test public warning and notification systems.
- Test Amateur Radio Communications
- Test collaboration and information sharing tools.
- Test new communications tools.
- Test 'out of County' communication capabilities.
- Test School District response.
- Test 'OERS' – Oregon Emergency Reporting System
- Test communication with and response of Federal Partners in WMD scenario.

### **3.0 CONCEPT / PURPOSE / OBJECTIVES**

#### 3.1 Concept

This will be a simulated time – two day - functional / full scale exercise. The City of Coos Bay EOC and the County EOC will be activated for this exercise. The EOC staff will utilize the City of Coos Bay and the Coos County Emergency Operations Plans to mitigate and minimize the effects of a Weapons of Mass Destruction event involving the communities and residents of Coos County.

#### 3.2 Purpose

To exercise the Coos County Emergency Operations Plan; Coos County Health Department Emergency Operations Plan; test and set protocols for emergency public notification; test critical communications infrastructure; and provide training for personnel.

#### 3.3 Objectives

- To create an Emergency Action Plan for dealing with WMD for Coos County Emergency Services.
- To create an Emergency Action Plan for dealing with WMD for Coos County Health Department.
- To determine the best media and procedures for mass notification of the public as well as “in the field” alerts to First Responders when normal communications channels collapse ensuring results are adaptable to an incident of any kind.
- To establish protocols for a Unified Command during WMD incident.
- To establish protocols for multi agency communications adaptable to an incident of any kind.

### **4.0 EXERCISE SCHEDULE**

Monday, May 19, 2003

0800 hrs. Exercise begins with a phone call to 9-1-1.

1200 hrs. End of day one.

Tuesday, May 20, 2003

0800 hrs. Exercise begins second day of events.

1200 hrs. Exercise ends.

1330 hrs. Exercise Debrief / Critique

(Mill Casino Hotel – Salmon Room, 13:30 – 16:30)

### **5.0 ARTIFICIALITIES AND ASSUMPTIONS**

#### 5.1 Artificiality's

- The Coos County EOC will be set up prior to the beginning of this exercise.

- The following involved agencies will be simulated:

Coast Guard  
Small Pox Response Team

- Any power or system outages will be simulated for this event.
- Situational matters are as stated in the narrative.

## 5.2 Assumptions

- Assumed weather conditions during the exercise will reflect actual occurring conditions.
- Exercise time will be accelerated to assume an eight-hour workday compressed into the four-hour exercise schedule.
- Staffing at the time of the event is normal for that time of the day.
- All established communication facilities are operating normally at the time of the beginning of the event.

## 6.0 SAFETY & SECURITY

### 6.1 Safety

- The safety of all participants and the general public will be observed at all times. If at any time during this exercise an actual emergency occurs, the exercise controller may suspend activities until which time the exercise may be continued.
- The exercise controller will have a list of all those participating in the Full Scale deployment of this exercise. This list will include any victims, emergency responders (fire, law enforcement, and ambulance crews), hospital staff setting up immunization clinic, ARES/RACES Ham Radio Operators, participating outside government agencies, and commercial communications vendors.
- Any off-site Full Scale participant list will include their location and/or destination.
- Any injury incurred by any participant shall be reported immediately to the exercise controller.
- No underage participant may be employed for this exercise without written parental permission and disclaimer.

## 6.2 Security

The Coos County Sheriff's Department and involved local government jurisdictions shall provide any security required for visiting dignitaries.

## 7.0 REFERENCES

- Coos County Emergency Operations Plan
- Coos County Public Health Department Emergency Operations Plan
- Bay Area Hospital Emergency Operations Plan
- City of Coos Bay Emergency Operations Plan
- Protocols established by the Center for Disease Control

## 8.0 EXERCISE CONTROL

This exercise will be controlled by the input of information from the Exercise Controller and Simulators.

## 9.0 COMMUNICATIONS

- All communications between participating agencies will normally occur via telephone, radio, fax machines, and/or courier.
- In the event that these forms of communications fail at some point in the exercise, alternate forms of communications will be utilized as provided by participating vendors to test their applicability, functionality and capabilities.
- ALL COMMUNICATIONS whether written, telephonic, radio, fax, computer generated, or broadcast, shall be preceded and ended with the statement; "THIS IS AN EXERCISE"!
- Any communication announcing an actual emergency during this event shall be preceded and ended with the statement; "THIS IS A REAL EMERGENCY". The person or agency making this announcement shall identify themselves and give the nature of the emergency indicating a recommendation to suspend the exercise, for the Exercise Controller and all participants.

## 10.0 REPORTS

See Section 2 After Action Report(s).

## 11.0 EVALUATION

- An exercise Debrief/Hot Wash will occur at the conclusion of the exercise.

- After Action Reports will be prepared by the participating entities indicating their level of participation, their goals during the exercise and whether those goals were met. This report is for their own information and to use as a catalyst for improvement in protocol and response as set by their standards.

## **12.0 INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS**

This is a training exercise! It is not a test of personnel. Actions and decisions should be consistent with the participant's Emergency Operation Plan and response protocols.

## **13.0 SCENARIO**

On May 17<sup>th</sup> 2003, the 'I'm A Lucky Sea Dog', a 200' private pleasure craft, registered out of Panama, arrives at the International Port of Coos Bay and docks at the Coos Bay City Dock. The Sharkey family owns 'I'm A Lucky Sea Dog'. Mr. Jay (Jaws) Sharkey and family have arrived to attend the wedding of their niece, Anita Sharkey, from Coquille. Mr. Sharkey's daughter, Frances, is a Brides Maid for her cousin Anita. The civil wedding took place on Sunday evening, May 18<sup>th</sup> at the Coquille Community Center's small auditorium with the reception immediately following in the large auditorium. Mr. Sharkey and his family hired a taxi to take them to the wedding and return them to the ship after the festivities at approximately 1:00 AM on the 19<sup>th</sup>. The four members of the ship's crew had turned in for the evening. On the morning of May 19<sup>th</sup> at approximately 6:30 AM, the ship's captain, Mr. Bligh, awakened Mr. Sharkey. Captain Bligh reported that crew member, Davey Jones, was not feeling well and was running a high fever and had strange bumps on his face and neck. Captain Bligh was very concerned about the condition of their newest crewmember that came aboard a week and a half ago while the ship was in port in Hawaii. Both Mr. Sharkey and Captain Bligh agree that Davey Jones needs immediate medical attention. Mr. Sharkey places a call to 9-1-1.

Emergency Medical Responders from Bay Cities Ambulance arrive at the Coos Bay City Dock and make contact with Mr. Sharkey and Captain Bligh. The ambulance crew examines Davey Jones and become concerned as Mr. Jones symptoms resemble Smallpox. This information is relayed via Med-Net to Bay Area Hospital and Davey Jones is transported to the hospital for treatment.

## **SECTION 2 – AFTER ACTION REPORT(S)**

### **1.0 FUNCTIONS TESTED**

#### **A. Alert Notification and Communications**

- **Telephone**
- **Television & Radio**
- **Amateur Radio**
- **Satellite Dish and Phone**
- **Software and Hardware**

The exercise was designed to test new technology. Nine private/commercial systems were evaluated during the exercise including:

**The MITRE Corporation** - The leadership in planning and execution provided by the MITRE Corporation was the foundation for the entire exercise. In resource-poor environments, expertise in planning and executing a full-scale drill for a WMD event is limited. The MITRE Corporation brought a cadre of experts to the table to assist with planning from concept through execution, to debriefing/hot wash. The MITRE Corporation also provided many tools for the event. The EOC and Simulation Center were equipped with cameras that broadcast a live-video stream securely via the Internet so that each location could view the activity at the other location and monitor the work while in progress. Additionally, MITRE provided a tablet PC complete with camera that provided the capability of taking photographs live at each exercise location that could then be wirelessly emailed to the appropriate agency for assessment purposes. Finally, MITRE provided a prototype tracking system known as SEAS through SRI, Inc. SEAS gave the emergency managers the capability to track the event on a tasking basis as it transpired. The system is setup to provide detail in a red, yellow, and green light format so the emergency manager can track the task progress and assess at a glance what needs to be accomplished. This tool in a future version would be indispensable to both managers and field personnel as an incident takes place. This exercise would not have been possible without the expertise and guidance provided by the MITRE Corporation.

**MyStateUSA.Com** – A National web portal developed to provide a means of communicating emergency security information enabling an integrated network of security information and secure communications available to communities, counties, regions and states across the nation for first responders and citizens alike. These sites are a means to deliver emergency information, promote economic development and meet the need for affordable information sharing tools in a community-based environment. The technology is only “a click away” for the end user who logs into the system with authentication through a password, types in the alert message, selects an individual or a group to send the alert to, and pushes the send button. The alert is then simultaneously distributed to both cell phones and email systems of one or many people. The effectiveness and functionality of the MyStateUSA.Com system during the exercise was the ability to communicate with many personnel, in a variety of locations through cell phone alerts and

also to have a permanent record of the alerts via email at the end of the process so data can be evaluated. The exercise included a simulated communications outage and the MyStateUSA.Com portal seamlessly delivered alerts via Satellite connectivity without bogging down the system.

**Radio Systems Marketing** – Radio systems engineering including redundancy, interoperability, and affordability were invaluable assets during the exercise. Radio Systems Marketing has provided system design to the New York National Guard, the Kentucky National Guard, and is currently working with the L.A. County Sheriff's Department. The ability to take inventory of existing assets and base design on the best possible system at the least possible cost is tantamount to success specifically in resource-poor environments. The expertise brought through equipment including a satellite panel, an interoperable radio black box that connects disparate radio systems, and satellite phones was a great addition to the exercise.

**Swan Island Networks/Oregon RAINS SWARM System** – The SWARM system - the Secure Wide-Area Response Management System - is a highly secure, next-generation rich media communications system that helps key managers communicate reliably and securely with various, targeted audiences. It steers around the vulnerabilities of traditional online communications systems - including, notably, bandwidth and other IT platform constraints - by virtue of its unique Smart Cache™ (pat. pend.) technology for end user devices. SWARM consists largely of Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS)-based Internet applications, utilizing SWARM's Smart Cache and operating inside a unique Web Services-style security framework that enables it to provide sensitive information communications inside and outside organizational firewalls. It is particularly good at managing secure, rich media information, including video, audio, 3D renderings, dynamic mapping systems, GIS elements, Powerpoints, HTML pages, etc. It carries focused, filtered and prioritized communications, tailored to an individual's function and responsibility. It is also a highly survivable system, providing considerable value even during network failures that can cripple traditional systems. During the exercise the SWARM system was utilized to deliver secure messaging to all in-station participants including digital photography of the ship, photography of patients, and video transmissions. The SWARM system also worked well over the satellite connection. Not yet deliverable to the field, future potential of this system is limitless and the company is working on delivery to field personnel, which is an invaluable tool.

**GoldStar/Mobile Satellite Systems/Moto Sat** – The simulated communications outage was included in the exercise by design. In reality, coastal areas are much more likely to be involved in an incident related to an earthquake or tsunami and critical communications infrastructure could easily be reduced or completely eliminated. The "Code Red" system consisting of a trailer, Moto Sat satellite dish, GlobalStar Satellite Phone, six PC wireless LAN, generator, and battery backup is invaluable should normal channels of communication be lost or impacted. The system provided approximately 256K download speeds and 64Kb upload speeds and was utilized to transmit both MyStateUSA.Com and Swan Island Networks SWARM information reliably. The Code Red system was designed as a mobile Emergency

Operations Center environment so it is both portable and easily erected with communications established in less than ten minutes.

**Edge Wireless Cell Phones & System** – Edge Wireless was also an invaluable corporate partner and supplied the exercise participants with cell phones. This cell phone usage was a great advantage so real emergency communications devices were not tied up during the exercise. The cell phones were used up to and during the communications outage with one side of the exercise team able to relay messages via cell phone and the other side of the team receiving alerts via email through the satellite connectivity. Edge Wireless has also offered future solutions through a cache of cell phones in the County that are only charged the use tax rather than a monthly cell phone bill which resource poor communities cannot afford to maintain. The County for future emergencies is considering this generous offer.

**ORCA Communications (A subsidiary of the Coquille Indian Tribe)** – Unfortunately, the Internet is a series of hops and jumps from one network to another providing for a number of points of failure during a crisis. ORCA Communications has provided an extremely reliable path on the Internet as well as a self-healing fiber ring around a portion of our communities. The “hops” are limited and therefore provide a straight shot from rural Oregon to the World via the Internet. They were the “only ones left standing” during the exercise and continue to be a strong supporter of our emergency agencies.

**Verizon Telephone Validation through 800 number** – One of the considerations of any emergency is communicating with emergency responders in the field. Unfortunately, to date, other than through a standard radio, there has been no way to validate that messages and alerts distributed to field personnel have indeed been received at the other end of the transmission. Verizon setup an 800 number for the exercise so our emergency personnel could call in to validate they had received the alerts sent out. This system provided a method for the Emergency Operation Center managers to know who had received what alert or message and was a great addition to the suite of tools provided to the team.

**ARES/RACES Ham Radio Operators** – Consummate professionals add to every exercise and the HAM Operators were strong in their ability to receive and deliver messages that in other situations would never have come through to the appropriate personnel. The HAM Operators are a significant partner in any exercise or event.

- B. Coordination and Control**
- **Incident Command System (ICS)**
  - **Emergency Operations Center (EOC)**
  - **Mutual Aid**
  - **Effectiveness of Coordination**

Before the start of the exercise, there were many discussions about what agency would be in charge of the incident. Due to the fact the incident was related to Public Health, the team determined it made the most sense for County Public Health to be the Incident Commander (IC) with support from

the EOC. In most other emergencies, the EOC would be the IC. As the exercise commenced, the City of Coos Bay stood up their EOC as the primary local agency. Bay Area Hospital, once patients were received, notified County Public Health, and the County erected the County EOC. The exercise progressed through most of the morning when the Coos Bay City EOC called the County EOC and County Public Health requesting a Unified Command. Due to the newness of a biological incident, the parties had a lengthy discussion about where the Unified Command should be located, who should be present, etc. During the Hot Wash/Debriefing, all parties agreed it was a challenge to determine who should be receiving what information and that a Unified Command would have streamlined the operations. This is definitely an area that requires further work, pre-planning, and exercising.

The EOC's worked according to plan, but the County EOC is lacking a system for tracking or logging issues, personnel, times, etc. as they happen and the ability to make the logging/tracking system visible to multiple parties. The exercise team tested a prototype provided by the MITRE Corporation and SRI, Inc., known as the SEAS system. The SEAS system is designed to provide this tracking and management accountability for each agency in a combined reporting system based on preformulated checklists. The system received good reviews by the exercise participants, but participants requested that the system be projected on the wall to make it more accessible to those performing multiple management tasks. Additionally, the SEAS system worked well over the satellite links. The SEAS system is setup as a Red Light, Yellow Light, Green Light system for emergency managers to track tasks and functionality in a variety of disciplines simultaneously on a single screen which allows the user to "drill-down" into subsequent levels for additional detail. The only other input from the SEAS users was the need for the top-level manager to have someone else "driving" the system, which was mentioned by almost all exercise participants. The technology is a valuable tool, but it is difficult to drive a fire hose and a laptop at the same time was an example cited.

Mutual Aid was simulated outside of the County for the exercise although the satellite and email were utilized to communicate with the Oregon Emergency Management Department. Because this was a new approach rather than phoning in the report, the email was delayed because the State believed the email sent declaring an emergency and requesting assistance was email spam. Theoretically, in the future if there were to be a communications failure of normal channels, the State would receive Declarations by any available communications method so this was a good learning process.

The effectiveness of the coordination for the exercise was good, but still requires improvements globally. As previously mentioned, there should have been a Unified Command with a representative from each affected agency present. Due in part to financial constraints and therefore staff limitations, this was not accomplished during the exercise, but all participants agreed it would be a focal point if a true event occurred.

## **Diversified Safety Management**

Local planning assistance was provided by Diversified Safety Management (DSM), a small company, located in Coquille, Oregon, with over 60 years of combined emergency management experience. DSM also acted as the exercise controllers and managed the simulation room for the exercise. The expertise in staging the exercise provided by DSM was invaluable and their knowledgebase in emergency management allowed the exercise to be highly successful, functional, and operationally accurate. The lessons learned through the process have definitely improved our area's preparedness and this was made possible by the dedication of these volunteers.

### **C. Emergency Public Information Effectiveness**

Public Information is another point of coordination that will require further evaluation. The team determined after the fact the need for multiple PIO's located in each participating agency that would coordinate with the overall PIO at the County level. Press releases were not reviewed by all agencies prior to release and the Press Conference that was held was not as coordinated as it could have been. Please also see Section 3 – Exercise Participants Comments for additional information regarding the Public Information process.

### **D. Damage Assessment**

In this exercise (Public Health oriented), the damage assessment (for lack of a better term) consisted of identifying the index case, determining the initial and additional rings of influence that the patients had come in contact with, and determining the best methods for managing, contacting, and dealing with those who may have been exposed to the Small Pox patients once confirmed. Quarantine orders were issued for both the patients at Bay Area Hospital and for the Ship. Security at Bay Area Hospital under these circumstances will be reevaluated as one of the patients escaped one of the negative pressure rooms only to be recaptured on hospital grounds. Additionally, the "wedding couple" left the area to go on their honeymoon in Reno, NV and had to be tracked down. Containment is an extremely difficult and challenging issue in this scenario and will require more planning.

### **E. Health and Medical**

The Coos County Public Health Department did an excellent job following their newly written Emergency Operations Plan and actually exercised it before it was complete. It is apparent that the PH Department is lacking many of the resources they would need if this had been a real event. Their computer systems are running different operating systems making it difficult to install programs, they don't have a full-time PC Technician so when the Incident Commander needed tools at the ready, they were unavailable, they quickly exhausted their resources and need to evaluate Mutual Aid amongst neighboring County Health Departments. Many valuable lessons were learned and further planning work is underway.

**F. Individual/Family Assistance**

Not instituted during the exercise other than for the immediate victims and those affected by the incident by the index case.

**G. Public Safety**

The City of Coos Bay Fire Department responded to the Ship where they encountered four patients (only one victim was “planned”). Masking of the Fire Crew was “simulated” as no masks were on the response unit. The patients were assessed and Bay Cities Ambulance transported the four patients who were ambulatory to Bay Area Hospital where they were detained in the ambulance until BAH could ready the required number of negative pressure rooms. The City of Coos Bay erected their EOC and notified the County, which established the County EOC. Again, much discussion ensued regarding Unified Command, where it should be located, etc. and all parties are discussing future approach. The Public Safety agencies did well in their response with minor critiques after the event.

**H. Public Works**

Not instituted during the exercise.

**I. Resource Management**

Resource Management was limited during the exercise due to the fact there was no funding for this event. Resources were therefore limited, but managed well. Discovery was made about the ability to track and log the incident as it unfolded. The SEAS prototype system provided by MITRE is a strong beginning. The difficulty with this technology was the need to have administrative assistance for the emergency manager to “drive” the system while still managing their other duties. The largest discovery was the need for a Unified Command and the configuration and location for this issue. Work continues to define this component although resources to develop this asset are extremely limited. Given the fact that Public Safety has expanded significantly since the events of 9-11, the equation now takes in Public Health, Hospitals, Ports, and others that prior to 9-11 had different basic missions, there is much work to do in communications, coordination, and cooperative ventures including more exercise requirements, plans development, etc.

**J. Warning**

Pre-planning was done with all of the local media outlets including print, radio, and television. Unfortunately, there is not a complete system for warning the public based on redundant infrastructures. Typically, the public will turn to the television or radio to gain immediate-need information. Should power be out, this media becomes less available. Print media also provides wide coverage, but on a less timely basis. The Internet is rapidly becoming a popular choice for notification, which reaches a broad audience, but again has limitations due to power outages and connectivity issues especially in

rural or geographically challenged areas. We believe the key is redundancy across several media outlets and the PIO's role is compounded in this area to ensure as many communications outlets as possible are employed and that consistent information is disseminated as quickly as possible to the public.

#### **K. Effectiveness of Warning**

Warnings to the public were not as effective as they could have potentially been due to the exercise taking longer to progress than anticipated. The print media did a terrific job of covering the events as they unfolded. We were not able to disseminate through radio and television as we had planned because of the unanticipated delays in the exercise events. Stronger coordination between agencies and multiple PIO's working together representing each agency involved would strengthen this effort.

Emergency declarations also were an issue in that during the exercise the EOC was without landline and cell phone communications (simulated). The only method of communication available to the EOC was through the MyStateUSA.com and Swan Island SWARM system and/or the Satellite phones. The County EOC sent their Emergency declaration via email to the State EOC requesting Presidential assistance to contain the outbreak. Unfortunately, this was a fairly new method of transmission and was somewhat unrecognized by the State as a "real event" due to the fact the email began and ended with the words "this is an exercise" and the fact most emergency declarations coming in from a county to the state level are done via fax not email. The exercise provided this valuable insight and the State is working on different forms of receipt for future exercises and real life events beyond a faxed transmission.

Valuable lessons were gained from the exercise and more importantly; new relationships were formed between all of our agencies. Additional exercises are critical to future preparedness, but will require funding to be effective. This grass roots effort was successful and our agencies are better for their participation in this joint effort to demonstrate how to coordinate emergency operations plans, how to communicate effectively, how to establish command structures, and what new tools are available to ensure there is redundant and reliable communications systems in place prior to a real life event.

Work continues!

## **APPENDIX:**

### **PROJECT SPONSORS:**

We would like to thank the sponsors that made this grass roots effort a huge success. The exercise and resulting growth would not have been possible without their guidance, expertise, and support!

- **Oregon Security Institute** (Planning, Implementation and Management)
- **The MITRE Corporation** (Planning and Technology Assistance)
- **City of Coquille** (Planning and Coordination)
- **Diversified Safety Management** (Planning and Coordination)
- **Coos County Emergency Management** (First Responder Agency)
- **Coos County Public Health** (First Responder Agency)
- **Bay Area Hospital** (First Responder Agency)
- **Coos County Sheriff's Department and 911** (First Responder Agency)
- **Coos County Public Information Officers** (First Responder Agency)
- **International Port of Coos Bay** (First Responder Agency)
- **City of Coos Bay Fire Department** (First Responder Agency)
- **City of Coos Bay Police Department** (First Responder Agency)
- **Bay Cities Ambulance** (First Responder Agency)
- **Red Cross** (Disaster Support and Relief)
- **ORCA Communications** (Telecommunications Support)
- **ARES/RACES HAM Radio Operators** (Telecommunications/Radio Support)
- **Coquille Valley Hospital** (First Responder Agency)
- **Southern Coos Hospital** (First Responder Agency)
- **Oregon Emergency Management** (First Responder Agency)
- **MyStateUSA.Com** (Technology Expertise and System Resources)
- **Radio Systems Marketing** (Technology Expertise and System Resources)
- **Swan Island Networks/Oregon RAINS** (Technology Expertise and System Resources)
- **Goldstar/Mobile Satellite Systems/Motosat** (Technology Expertise and System Resources)
- **Edge Wireless** (Technology Expertise and System Resources)
- **Coquille School District #8** (Location and Facility Resources)
- **Southwestern Oregon Community College** (Location and Facility Resources)
- **Sause Bros., Inc.** (Location and Facility Resources)
- **The World Newspaper** (Public Communications Dissemination)
- **KCBY-TV** (Public Communications Dissemination)
- **The Lighthouse Radio Group** (Public Communications Dissemination)
- **Koos News Newspaper** (Public Communications Dissemination)
- **Curry County Emergency Management** (Expertise and Observer)

**Hot Wash/Debriefing**  
**Meeting Mill Casino**  
**May 20, 2003**  
**1:30 PM**

***City of Coos Bay Fire:***

Tapped out:  
Fire personnel  
Bay Area Ambulance  
Coos Bay Police Dept  
Contaminated personnel/families/equipment-failed to inform others of contamination  
Notified police & elected officials  
8 hours into incident requested unified command

***Curry County Emergency Management:***

Found it difficult to keep track of incident from Coquille EOC  
Stated communication is most important

***Coos County Public Health:***

Needed computer in front of her or projected on the wall to make things easily accessible

***Coos County Public Information Officers:***

Had trouble getting info to/from EOC  
Stated communication was lacking  
Each agency needs a PIO to report and communicate

***Coos County Public Health:***

"SEAS" program

1. Wants to see the time displayed (Need a Universal Clock for the Event for everyone involved)
2. Should be more user friendly
3. It's a slow program

HAM was comfortable to use

***The MITRE Corporation:***

Explained program would be used differently in an actual incident but did agree the program was slow

***Bay Area Hospital:***

Felt "out of it". They knew what they were doing but was not aware of what was going on with other agencies.

Hand radio operation went well however, they were slow on the first day.

Mystate cell phones were great

Would like EOC upgraded to digital

Problem relaying info from Coquille to Coos Bay

Did not have a specimen supply kit

Needs better layout & hookups

Time frames were confusing, suggested central clock on Internet

***Bay Area Hospital:***

Victim wanted diplomatic immunity  
Hospital didn't have authority/needed to contact FBI or State Dept  
Main Concern: health of patients & community  
Reported to Health Dept but did not hear back as to what if anything happened  
Didn't feel they had the authority to contact FBI

***Coos County Public Health***

Wasn't clear who was supposed to call police and handle security  
Issued immediate quarantine  
Had problems getting names of individuals from hospital for the courts  
Had problems getting name of boat

***Coos County Public Health***

Assumed hospital would get sample  
Hospital & Public Health did not have equipment to obtain sample  
Needs more communication on who is responsible for what

***Bay Area Hospital:***

Needs to get equipment for obtaining a specimen

***Coos County Public Health***

Alerts were not identify as to where they were coming from

***Coos County Emergency Management***

Email for declaration was considered SPAM

***City of Coos Bay Fire:***

Immunity is an INS issue and would have been taken care of in 10-15 minutes  
Would have been made part of briefing to EOC  
Crisis Management-FBI issue  
Consequence Management-FEMA issue

***Bay Area Hospital:***

Wants to know if victim can leave before quarantine  
Stan Gibson stated they could hold victim until determination and then goes to Francis for quarantine

***Simulators:***

Stan should of done unified command earlier to make things run smoother  
Who claims incident command?

***Coos County Public Information Officers:***

Needed to know who was in charge of what  
Need to merge all agencies' EOC plans to work together

***The World Newspaper:***

Had hard time getting a hold of people  
Press conference scheduled @ 11am and was held @ 10:50am  
World Paper was last to know, wants to be put higher on priority list  
Get as much info to press to notify public, person thought they were infected with SARS

**HAM Operators:**

Wants station established with County Health-working on it with FEMA

**General Discussion:**

Cell phones did not work in brick building (SWOCC)

Install extra antennas in a building designated for an incident

Need IT person on-site at Public Health

Hospital can be a resource for extra bodies to assist other agencies with various tasks

**SMALLPOX AS A BIOLOGICAL WEAPON**

If used as biological weapon, smallpox represents a serious threat to civilian populations because of its case-fatality rate of 30% or more among unvaccinated persons and the absence of specific therapy. Although smallpox has long been feared as the most devastating of all infectious diseases, its potential for devastation today is far greater than at any previous time. Routine vaccination throughout the United States ceased more than 25 years ago. In a now highly susceptible, mobile population, smallpox would be able to spread widely and rapidly throughout this country and the world.

Smallpox probably was first used as a biological weapon during the French and Indian Wars (1754-1767) by British forces in North America. Soldiers distributed blankets that had been used by smallpox patients with the intent of initiating outbreaks among American Indians. Epidemics occurred, killing more than 50% of many affected tribes. With Edward Jenner's demonstration in 1796 that an infection caused by cowpox protected against smallpox and the rapid diffusion worldwide of the practice of cowpox inoculation (i.e., vaccination), the potential threat of smallpox as a bioweapon was greatly diminished.

Smallpox was once worldwide in scope, and before vaccination was practiced, almost everyone eventually contracted the disease. There were 2 principal forms of the disease, variola major and a much milder form, variola minor (or alastrim).

A global campaign, begun in 1967 under the aegis of the World Health Organization (WHO), SUCCEEDED IN ERADICATING SMALLPOX IN 1977. In 1980, the World Health Assembly recommended that all countries cease vaccination. A WHO expert committee recommended that all laboratories destroy their stocks of variola virus or transfer them to 1 of 2 WHO reference laboratories – the Institute of Virus Preparations in Moscow, Russia, or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, GA. All countries reported compliance. The WHO committee later recommended that all virus stocks be destroyed in June 1999, and the 1996 World Health Assembly concurred. In 1998, possible research uses for variola virus were reviewed by a committee of the Institute of Medicine, (IOM). The IOM committee concluded, as did the preceding WHO committee, that there were research questions that might be addressed if the virus were to be retained. However, the IOM committee did not explore the costs or relative priority to be assigned to such an effort, and that committee was not asked to weigh the possible benefits resulting from an international decision to destroy all virus stocks. These considerations would be weighed and decided by the 1999 World Health Assembly. Recent allegations from Ken Alibek, a former deputy director of the Soviet Union's civilian bioweapons program, have heightened concern that smallpox

might be used as a bioweapon. Alibek reported that beginning in 1980, the Soviet government embarked on a successful program to produce the smallpox virus in large quantities and adapt it for use in bombs and intercontinental ballistic missiles; the program had an industrial capacity capable of producing many tons of smallpox virus annually. Furthermore, Alibek reports that Russia even now has a research program that seeks to produce more virulent and contagious recombinant strains. Because financial support for laboratories in Russia has sharply declined in recent years, there are increasing concerns that existing expertise and equipment might fall into non-Russian hands. The deliberate reintroduction of smallpox as an epidemic disease would be an international crime of unprecedented proportions, but it is now regarded as a possibility. An aerosol release of variola virus would disseminate widely, given the considerable stability of the orthopoxviruses in aerosol form and the likelihood that the infectious dose is very small. Moreover, during the 1960's and 1970's in Europe, when smallpox was imported during the December to April period of high transmission, as many as 10 to 20 second-generation cases were often infected from a single case. Widespread concern and, sometimes, panic occurred, even with outbreaks of fewer than 100 cases, resulting in extensive emergency control measures.

#### Epidemiology :

- Highly infectious after aerosolization
- Person-to-person transmission can occur via droplet nuclei or aerosols expelled from the oropharynx and by direct contact
- Contaminated clothing or bed linens can also spread the virus
- About 30% of susceptible contacts will become infected

#### Clinical:

- Incubation period is 12-14 days (ranges 7-17 days)
- Characteristic rash appears 2-3 days after nonspecific, flu-like prodrome (fever and headache)
- Maculopapular rash begins on mucosa of mouth and pharynx, face, hands, forearms and spreads to legs and centrally to trunk
- Lesions progress synchronously on any given part of the body from macules to papules to vesicles to pustules to crusty scabs

#### Laboratory Diagnosis:

- Mask and gloves should be worn by person obtaining specimen, preferably a person who has been recently vaccinated
- Vesicular fluid is obtained by opening lesions with a blunt edge of a scalpel, harvesting fluid with cotton swab; scabs can be removed by forceps. Swabs and scabs should be placed in a vacutainer, sealed with tape, and placed in a second, durable, watertight container
- Laboratory specimens must be handled in a Biosafety Level 4 facility (e.g. CDC) and will be evaluated with electron microscopy and cell culture

#### Patient Isolation:

- Strict isolation in negative pressure room (high efficiency particulate air filtration ideal) from onset of rash until all scabs separate
- Laundry and waste should be autoclaved before being laundered or incinerated

Treatment:

- Supportive care is the mainstay of therapy
- In-vitro antiviral activity against poxviruses has been shown with adefovir, cidofovir, dipivoxil, and ribavirin. (Animal studies suggest that cidofovir may be most effective).

Prophylaxis:

- Smallpox vaccine would be required for all persons exposed at the time of the bioterrorist attack or anyone with close personal contact with a smallpox case
- Vaccine is most effective if given before or within 3 days of exposure
- Ideally, all exposed persons should be placed in strict quarantine for 17 days after last contact with a smallpox case.

References: Breman JG, Henderson DA. Poxvirus dilemmas – monkeypox, smallpox and biological terrorism. *New Engl J Med* 1998; 339:566-559

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